Tactical Decision Game #96-8 Solution A


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Tactical Decision Game Solution #96-8 A August 1996

Air Attack Against the
Bridges of Madison County

by Thomas W. Rumping

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Decision and Action

My decision is to attack the enemy formation immediately and repeatedly. First, I would mark the enemy's location. Then, breaking radio silence, I would immediately communicate to the rest of the flight: "Flight, mark your location.... enemy mech formation ten o'-clock.... come starboard." Once the flight started starboard, "Flight, locate and attack the lead enemy units, plan multiple passes so we can delay their movement toward the rail yard as long as possible, save bridge ordnance for last pass in case we get a chance to continue on to the bridge once help arrives." I would then radio to higher command and the controlling agencies, ".... sizable enemy mech formation located SE of the Madison bridge, 8-10 nautical miles northwest of Lemay along Rte. 141 moving southeast, we are attempting to delay. Request an airborne tactical air controller/forward air controller (TAC(A)/FAC(A)) at our location. Our primary target (bridge) is still intact."

Rationale

On spotting the sizable enemy formation heading in the direction of the rail yard, I realize the enemy has already crossed the Madison bridge and that our mission to destroy the bridge had become of lesser relevance to the ACE commander's overall intent, i.e., preventing the enemy from reaching the rail yard in any sizable force prior to our forces capturing it. Knowing the distance between the enemy force, rail yard, and our own forces, it was apparent that the enemy was well in advance of our forces and that he would get there first. I immediately attacked in an attempt to delay the enemy's arrival while calling for help. Knowing the ground combat element (GCE) and ACE Commanders' intents, i.e., their desire to neutralize the enemy's reserves and resupply convoys with general support aircraft held in waiting, I broke radio silence and in formed the respective command posts and any TAC(A)/FAC(A) of the impending danger. I ordered my division to make multiple passes in an attempt to disrupt the lead units and thereby delay the enemy formation. My intent was to create confusion and cause a bottleneck in the hope the rest of the enemy formation would disperse and take cover to avoid being the next victim of an aerial attack. My division knew that if they could delay the enemy until help arrived, they would accomplish their mission, even though the bridge is still intact.

Decision Considerations

The real question was "Do I change my mission to better meet the commander's intent?" The answer was "Yes." I chose not to split up my division, not to send two aircraft on to the bridge and two to attack the formation, because I didn't want to dilute my efforts. It was going to be hard enough to slow down the enemy mech force with four aircraft, let alone with two aircraft. I chose to turn starboard to avoid antiaircraft fire while we reoriented ourselves for the new mission and communicated the new developments to higher command. I wanted the division to use the bridge ordnance last so, if help arrived before we dropped all our munitions, we would have the option of carrying out our original mission.

I chose to attack the enemy first rather than after I attacked the bridge because I realized the enemy units themselves were the real target, not the bridge. The question then became "Is this a vanguard unit for a much larger force or is this all there is?" I had to answer that question because if the bridge were destroyed, it could delay additional, much larger, enemy forces from entering the area. But I realized that the only "known" and "certain" enemy force that could reach the town of Lemay prior to friendly forces was the enemy mech formation we had sighted across the bridge. Any additional enemy forces would arrive too late to matter. I also knew that this was not the only bridge, but it could be the only enemy force coming! I also realized that it is always difficult to relocate a moving target on the ground in fast flying fixed- wing aircraft.

In this scenario, even though the mission was designed to take the initiative and be proactive, the aviators found themselves and their comrades on the ground reacting to the unexpected. But because of mission type orders and decentralized control, they had the freedom to change their target so as to adhere to the intent of their commanders; they were able to regain the initiative and make a difference.

For more detailed information on the structure of Marine Corps units, Marine Corps equipment, and symbols used in Tactical Decision Game sketches, see Marine Corps Gazette, October 1994, pp. 53-56 and the modification reported in the January, 1995, edition on page 5.