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| Duke | NROTC | Solution A | Main TDG Page | Solution C | Setup |
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| Duke | NROTC | Solution A | Main TDG Page | Solution C | Setup |
"Our assigned mission is to attack at once and destroy the enemy mechanized-tank force that reportedly has overrun Faludi Airstrip.
"Company C: You are the main effort. Attack Faludi Airstrip and destroy enemy there.
"Company A: Attack Faludi and destroy enemy there. Be prepared to reinforce Charlie on order.
"Whippet (LAR Platoon): Hold the ZSUs in place. Block any enemy movement north on Rte 10A. Report to Bravo LAR upon their arrival.
"Company B (LAR): Detach one platoon to me as battalion reserve. Assume control of Whippet and then attack and destroy ZSUs located south east of Whippet. Do not pursue more than 5 kilometers. Block enemy forces from moving north along Rte 10A trace.
"TOWs: Two teams to Alpha; three teams to Charlie.
"CP moves with Alpha."
The uncertainty in the situation prevents long-term, detailed planning. My plan commits units against enemy closest to them. Charlie, the strongest company, conducts the main effort against the largest known enemy force. Alpha attacks a weaker enemy and is in position to reinforce Charlie if needed. The most mobile force guards the south and southeast. We have a small but highly mobile reserve available.
Due to the nature of the visible enemy vehicles, it appears our battalion has slipped into a soft enemy area. We can therefore expect a rapid and hard enemy response probably from the north and or northeast. The intelligence from division on enemy strength and composition at the airstrip does not fit with Charlie's direct observation. It is difficult to imagine two understrength tank companies having trouble dispatching what appears to be mostly trucks.
If enemy response from north and northeast is rapid and strong our battalion would have to fall back to higher ground west of Wadi Grande assuming that area is passable. If not passable, battalion would have to fall back to the. mound currently occupied by the ZSUs. Because of low ammunition, we are not well prepared for a major engagement with a large, determined enemy.
If on the other hand the enemy force that overran the airstrip has already moved south down Rte lOA, it would be reasonable to expect them to return and retake the airstrip. A major attack coming from the south into our rear would reverse the situation. Instead of us being the relatively strong force attacking a weak force on the airstrip, we could be the weak force on the airstrip, short of ammo and under strong attack from the south. My plan, however, puts a strong LAV force to the south, which would give us early warning. This and the fact that division is well aware of our situation suggests the plan is worth the risk