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Commander's Mission Assessment

I strongly recommend that U.S. Marines are not used to undertake such a mission for the following reasons:

• First and foremost is the ability of the two leaders to come and go at will and independently of one another. For any plan to capture to succeed would need both subjects in relatively the same place at the same time. Even assuming a mission-ready load of men, equipment, and aircraft at all times, that both subjects will be in Mosovic when the assault force arrives is an unsound assumption and poor risk.
• Assuming, for a moment that we receive intelligence that both men are likely to be in Mosovic for some time (e.g., political-military conference), the weather at sea, on land and/or en route at this time of the year may not allow all assets to launch or reach their appointed stations on time. With assets missing or delayed, the entire mission would be at risk. Similarly the weather could jeopardize the safe return of all assets, and the captured subjects, to their respective bases.
• A tangent to the above is that there are no secondary locations to which aircraft, rotary or otherwise, "once feet dry" can turn to in the event of mechanical failure, weather problems, or damage. Any subsequent mission to recover aircraft or personnel would be all the more difficult to conduct post-assault, as the enemy would be fully alerted by our activity.
• The Serbian security forces already reported to be in Mosovic have the ability with their SA-7b missiles to impose heavy loss of life on U.S. Marines before landing and after takeoff by helicopter. The SA-7bs cannot be pinned down to a particular location by either the French recon team or the array of intelligence sources we have at our disposal and cannot be rendered ineffective or neutralized by our assets prior to or during any assault. It would be naive at best to think that Serbian security forces do not have such weapons with their out posts/patrolsÑmost likely on Hills 881N, 881S, 916 and 861. Similarly assuming the capture of the two subjects, it may happen that they are killed by surface-to-air missile fire as they depart as prisoners aboard a chopper. If this transpires, what was the point of the mission?

I therefore recommend that we discourage the National Security Council (NSC) option on the military grounds outlined above.

In conclusion, I would like to point out that the aforementioned briefing did contain two statements of intent, one Presidential and one from the NSC, examined above. The President's intent is broader in scope and can be distilled as follows a) to deter Serbian buildup, b) to deter their aggressive posturing and c) to counter the feeling of safety the Serbs have in Mosovic. I believe that these broader aims have a greater military chance of success and can be conducted with the forces at my disposal. Not having been asked specifically to address this issue, I will briefly outline an option.

• The three road bridges around Mosovic would be destroyed using Marine air assets from Aviano and Carrier Group 3. The destruction could be done with a diminished threat from SA-7 missiles, because of airframe and ordnance load and at a time of our choosing; night cover would be opportune.
• Using a combination of French intelligence sources and our own (to include Joint STARS), the bivouac for the Mihailovich Brigade would be clearly located and then attacked with air assets. This attack would coincide with the bridge attack.

In using military force in this manner the Serbs would receive a direct blow in the areas the President intended. Such a strike, in my opinion, has a greater chance of success with a diminished risk to U.S. forces.

For more detailed information on the structure of Marine Corps units, Marine Corps equipment, and symbols used in Tactical Decision Game sketches, see Marine Corps Gazette, October 1994, pp. 53-56 and the modification reported in the January, 1995, edition on page 5.